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ABSTRACT
We analyze the price pass-through effect of the minimum wage and use the results to provide
insight into the competitive structure of low-wage labor markets. Using monthly price series, we
find that the pass-through effect is entirely concentrated on the month that the minimum wage
change goes into effect, and is much smaller than what the canonical literature has found. We
then discuss why our results differ from that literature, noting the impact of series interpolation
in generating most of the previous results. We then use the variation in the size of the minimum
wage change to evaluate the competitive nature of low-wage labor markets. Finally, we exploit
the rich variation in minimum wage policy of the last 10–15 years—including the rise of stateand city-level minimum wage changes and the increased use of indexation—to investigate how
the extent of price pass-through varies by policy context. This paper contributes to the literature
by clarifying our understanding of the dynamics and magnitude of the pass-through effect and
enriching the discussion of how different policies may shape the effect that minimum wage hikes
have on prices.
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In recent years, partly due to inaction among lawmakers to raise the federal minimum
wage, states and cities have increasingly passed their own minimum wage laws. These state and
city laws promoted a renaissance in the study of the employment effect of minimum wage hikes
for two main reasons. First, they created greater numbers of minimum wage changes to be
studied using then-standard techniques. Second, by increasing geographical variation in
minimum wage policy, state and city lawmakers created the opportunity to employ “natural
experiments” whereby the employment statistics in a state that increased its minimum wage
could be compared to those in surrounding states that did not increase their minimum wage.
Because of this renaissance, two sides of the minimum wage research developed. One side found
that, contrary to the previously accepted belief, some minimum wage hikes led to either no
decline in employment or a slight increase in employment (e.g., Card and Krueger 1994, 1995;
Dube, Lester, and Reich 2010). A second side continued to find evidence supporting the claim
that minimum wage hikes did reduce employment (e.g., Neumark 2001; Neumark and Wascher
2002, 2007, 2008).1 A comprehensive overview of this research can be found in Belman and
Wolfson (2014).
An additional important, although less-studied, question addresses the impact such hikes
have on output prices, that is, the “pass-through” effect. Early studies include Wessels (1980)
and Card and Krueger (1995). The most influential of these studies, however, has been a series
of papers by Daniel Aaronson and coauthors. Aaronson (2001), MacDonald and Aaronson
(2006), Aaronson and French (2007), and Aaronson, French, and MacDonald (2008) find
evidence for the claim that minimum wage hikes increase output prices and that the size of this
pass-through suggests that the increased cost associated with a minimum wage hike is
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Explanations for small negative or positive employment effects included the existence of various market
frictions arising from imperfect competition or search (e.g., Bhaskar and To 1999; Lang and Khan 1998).
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completely passed along to consumers.2 Aaronson and coauthors used their findings to argue that
low-wage labor markets are highly competitive and, by implication, that minimum wage hikes
necessarily lower employment. This literature on pass-though, then, is important both in itself
and because it sheds indirect light on the ongoing debate over the employment effect of
minimum wage hikes.
This paper contributes to the literature on price pass-through by presenting more accurate
estimates of the pass-through effect than found in the previous literature, and by using these
results to give insight into the competitive structure of low-wage labor markets. In particular, we
find that the size of the pass-through effect is much smaller than previously reported, and that the
characteristics of pass-through are more consistent with a model of the labor market based on
some degree of market power on the demand side than they are with perfect competition.
Additionally, we exploit the rich variation in minimum wage policy—the rise of state- and citylevel minimum wages, as well as the increased use of indexation of the minimum wage to the
CPI in areas such as Florida, Washington, Ohio, and San Francisco—to investigate how the
extent of pass-through varies by policy context. For instance, we find that the size of the passthrough effect is smaller when the minimum wage is indexed to inflation and does not vary
significantly depending on whether the minimum wage change happens at the federal or state
level.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE

Previous empirical studies have concluded that minimum wage hikes produce substantial
price pass-through effects. The oft-cited study by Aaronson (2001) estimated the magnitude of
2

The studies cited above are for the United States. Lemos (2008) provides a survey of the literature.
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the pass-through using metropolitan-area food away from home (FAFH) CPI data between 1978
and 1995. In the base specification (p. 162), which included only monthly and yearly controls,
the cumulative wage-price elasticity from three months before up to three months after a
minimum wage hike was estimated at about 0.07, meaning that a 10 percent increase in the
minimum wage is associated with a 0.7 percent increase in FAFH prices. Aaronson, French, and
MacDonald (2008) used microlevel restaurant price data for the period 1995–1997, during which
two changes to the federal minimum wage were implemented, to generate a wage-price elasticity
of, again, about 0.07.3 Though the empirical literature is somewhat limited outside of these two
formative works (see Lemos [2008] for a review), other studies have found similar results in
other countries and other cases.4
The magnitude of the pass-through has been presented as being consistent with what
models of a perfectly competitive labor market would predict about the size of the pass-through.
Based on the assumption that demand elasticities of fast-food, labor share, and capital-labor
elasticity took on standard values found in the literature, Aaronson and French (2007) and
Aaronson, French, and MacDonald (2008) estimated that in a perfectly competitive industry, a
10 percent increase in the minimum wage would lead to approximately a 0.7 percent increase in
output prices, which was exactly what they had found in their empirical work.5 They concluded,

3
Behind this average price increase was substantial variation: prices for some restaurant items grew faster
than this average, while prices for other items grew slower than the average, and some prices even fell after a
minimum wage hike. The price increase was also higher in limited-service restaurants than it was in full-service
restaurants.
4
Other studies include Fougère, Gautier, Bihan (2010), who studied France; Lemos (2006), who studied
Brazil; and Wadsworth (2010) and Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen (2011) who both studied the U.K. Another
national-level study that focuses on the prices of a few restaurant items (burgers, chicken, pizza) is Basker and Khan
(2013).
5
Although the overall thrust of the existing empirical literature on minimum wage hike pass-though is to
support the claim that labor markets for restaurants are best characterized by competition, the evidence is not
unambiguous. For instance, Aaronson and French (2007, p. 696) write after their analysis of BLS micro price data
for restaurants, “Given that some restaurants do not increase their prices after minimum wage hikes, but restaurants
that do raise their prices usually do by more than 0.7 percent, it is difficult to compare the observed price response to
the competitive prediction.”
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therefore, that their estimates of pass-through supported the claim that low-wage labor markets
are best characterized as perfectly competitive. If low-wage labor markets are perfectly
competitive, then an increase in the minimum wage increases the marginal cost of labor, which
leads, in turn, to higher production costs, higher prices, and, importantly, lower employment.
This work on the pass-through therefore speaks to the on-going controversy about the
competitive structure of low-wage labor markets and thus about the employment impact of a
minimum wage increase.
Policy and academic work has frequently cited the above studies by Aaronson and coauthors as the authoritative studies on minimum wages and pass-through.6 However, these
studies deserve to be updated for a couple of reasons.
First, these studies rely on data from no later than 1997, but since that time we have seen
an increase in the variation of minimum wage policy across several dimensions.7 For instance,
since 1997 we have seen a profusion of state and city minimum wage laws whose effect we
cannot assume are identical to federal minimum wage hikes. Further, some states and cities have
implemented laws that provide for scheduled increases in their minimum wage often indexed to
some measure of price inflation. In this way, these new policies differ from the majority of
minimum wages investigated by Aaronson and coauthors, which were often large, one-shot
increases implemented with relatively little warning to businesses. Again, we cannot presume
these new types of minimum wage hikes affect prices, or more generally the economy, in the
same way minimum wage changes implemented before 1997 did. Indeed, one contribution of our

6

Most of the later pass-through literature cites this paper as the canonical example, as well as much of the
rest of the literature on the effects of the minimum wage such as Dube et al. (2010) and MaCurdy (2015).
7
The use of data from this period continues up to present studies, as seen in MaCurdy (2015), who uses
data from 1996, and from a single federal minimum wage increase, to draw conclusions about all minimum wages.
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study is to present a comparative analysis of different types of minimum wage policies within a
common data and econometric setting.
Table 1 details the differences between the minimum wages considered by Aaronson and
coauthors with those we consider in this study. The table shows that state-level minimum wage
increases are much more common—and federal-level increases much less common—after 1998.
Other variations in policy such as indexed, city minimum wages, or perpetually scheduled
minimum wage increases were absent or nearly absent from the period considered by the
previous studies.
Second, we use the data differently than Aaronson (2001) did in order to extract greater
insight into the process of pass-through. For instance, we treat monthly and bimonthly price
series separately (instead of combining them, as did Aaronson [2001]) to better reveal the
dynamics of pass-through pricing. Furthermore, by embracing the complicating factor of
multiple-state metropolitan areas (instead of avoiding it as did Aaronson [2001]), we are able to
more accurately measure the impact of different types of minimum wage increases, and thereby
are able to shed additional light on the nature of competition in low-wage labor markets.
Finally, by using data after 1997 we are able to use CPI data that are less affected by
various biases (such as substitution bias) that was not available to Aaronson (2001). This will
again permit us to generate more accurate estimates of the extent of pass-through.
Looking ahead to the results, our first main finding is that wage-price elasticities are
notably lower than reported in previous work: we find prices grow by 0.36 percent for every 10
percent increase in the minimum wage, which is almost half of the previously accepted 0.7
percent.8 Second, we find that pass-through is primarily concentrated on the month that the

8

This 0.036 elasticity is similar to what was found by Card and Krueger (1995, p. 54) in their study of a
single minimum wage increase in New Jersey.
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minimum wage hike goes into effect, with no appreciable impact on the month before or after.
This finding contradicts most of the previous research. Third, we argue that estimated passthrough is consistent with market power on the demand-side of low-wage labor markets (e.g.,
monopsony or monopsonistic competition), which sheds light on one of the more contentious
issues in the debates over the employment impact of minimum wage hikes. If low-wage labor
markets are not perfectly competitive, no guarantee exists that a minimum wage hike will lead to
lower employment. Fourth, we find that not all minimum wage hikes are the same. For instance,
small, scheduled minimum wage hikes have smaller impacts on prices than large, one-time
minimum wage hikes. Yet we find no significant differences between state- and federal-level
minimum wage increases, even though we might expect business flight to have a larger impact in
the case of state-level minimum wage changes.

DATA AND DATA TRANSFORMATIONS
The dependent variable in this study is the change in the log of food away from home
CPI (FAFH CPI), a price index generated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for select U.S.
metropolitan areas. FAFH includes food purchased and consumed outside of the home, and for
the most part includes items sold at full- and limited-service restaurants.9 These data are
available on the BLS website. We include in our analysis all metropolitan areas that have either
monthly or bimonthly FAFH data for at least part of the period of our study, 1978–2015, which
gives us 28 series.10
9
Additionally, FAFH includes ready-to-eat food purchased at motels and restaurants, food provided at
employer and school sites, along with food purchased at vending machines and from mobile vendors. See BLS
(YEAR? Chapter 17). For conciseness, we will refer in the text to “restaurants” when we talk about the group of
sites selling food away from home.
10
Using the major city within the area to identify them, the metropolitan areas included in our study are:
Anchorage (bimonthly, until 1986), Atlanta (bimonthly, full time period), Baltimore (bimonthly, until 1995), Boston

6

We begin our analysis in 1978 because that is the year Aaronson (2001) started his
analysis. The minimum wage increase in 1978 was also the first one after the implementation of
changes in the Fair Labor Standards Act that directly affected the restaurant industry (for
instance, a restructured tip credit process and a repeal of the partial exemption of restaurant
employees from overtime rules), along with the expansion of the minimum wage to all covered,
nonexempt employees. Thus, 1978 was the first year in which minimum wage changes would
affect all minimum wage workers regardless of occupational status or industry, giving our
estimates more consistency than if we relied on earlier data where different minimum wages
affected different subsets of workers.11
One characteristic of the CPI data requires comment. In January 1999, the BLS switched
to a geometric mean formula when they calculated CPI price indexes. This switch was prompted
by arguments that the BLS’s method for calculating the CPI before 1999 produced an upward
bias to the CPI and its subcomponents. The new geometric mean formula could mimic
consumers’ substitution between the products they buy in response to changes in relative prices,
something the previously used Laspeyres formula did not do.12 If the CPI was biased upward
before 1999, then any study of the size of the pass-through that uses pre-1999 CPI data, such as
Aaronson (2001), generates estimates of the pass-through that are potentially biased upward. Our
study, which uses data for 1978–2015, is able to use the more accurate geometric mean-based
(bimonthly, full period), Buffalo (bimonthly, until 1986), Chicago (monthly, full period), Cincinnati (bimonthly,
until 1986), Cleveland (bimonthly, full period), Baltimore/Washington D.C. (bimonthly, since 1995), Washington
D.C. (bimonthly, until 1995), Dallas (bimonthly, full period), Denver (bimonthly, until 1986), Detroit (monthly until
1986, then bimonthly for rest of period), Honolulu (bimonthly, until 1986), Houston (bimonthly, full period),
Kansas City (bimonthly, until 1986), Los Angeles (monthly, full time period), Miami (bimonthly, full period),
Milwaukee (bimonthly, until 1986), Minneapolis (bimonthly, until 1986), New York City (monthly, full period),
Philadelphia (monthly until 1997, then bimonthly for rest of period), Pittsburgh (bimonthly, until 1997), Portland
(bimonthly, until 1986), San Diego (bimonthly, until 1986), San Francisco (monthly between 1987 and 1997,
bimonthly for the rest of the series), Seattle (bimonthly until 1986 and then from 1997 for the rest of the period), St.
Louis (bimonthly until 1997).
11
See, for instance, http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/coverage.htm (accessed June 21, 2016).
12
Dalton, Greenlees, and Stewart (1998) provide an overview of this change.
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CPI for the second half of the period and therefore is able to generate more accurate estimates of
pass-through.
The main independent variable of interest in our regression is the change in (binding)
minimum wage rates. Our data on minimum wages come from various issues of the Monthly
Labor Review, state Department of Labor reports, and, for San Francisco, San Jose, Oakland,
Berkeley, Washington, D.C., and Prince George’s and Montgomery counties, city and county
ordinances. As indicated in Table 2, the years 1978–2015 saw 11 federal minimum wage
increases, 126 binding state minimum wage increases, and 23 city minimum wage increases.
Table 2 reports the month and year of passage for all of these increases.
We also include, in most of our regressions, control variables such as month, year, and a
metropolitan area fixed-effects. One additional control is “CPI-All” (Urban Consumers),
included to take into account various unknown determinants of FAFH CPI inflation).13 The
inclusion of the latter control variable might rob some of the influence from minimum wage
changes as this control variable is affected by inflation in the FAFH sector. As will be seen,
however, this does not seem to be a problem, as when CPI-All is included in our regressions it
has virtually no effect on our main coefficients of interest.
The BLS generates FAFH CPI for multistate metropolitan areas by using prices from
restaurants located in more than one state. For example, in the case of the New York-Northern
New Jersey-Long Island metropolitan area, the FAFH CPI is constructed from prices taken from
a sample of restaurants located in four states: New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and
Connecticut. Therefore, the FAFH CPI for this single multistate metropolitan area is potentially
affected by minimum wage hikes implemented by four different states. Table 3 provides

13

Published by the BLS and available at www.bls.gov.
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information about the metropolitan areas in our sample that include territory from more than a
single state.
The existence of multistate metropolitan areas provides a benefit to this study. We are
able to include in our data set many more state minimum wage changes than would have been
the case if, say, the New York metropolitan area only included territory from New York State
alone. But we to transform a single-state minimum wage increase affecting only restaurants in
one portion of in a multistate metropolitan area into a variable measuring its impact on average
FAFH prices in the full metropolitan area. We will assume that a 10 percent state minimum wage
hike that affects only 20 percent of the restaurants in a metropolitan area (that is, those
restaurants in that state) will have an impact on prices equal to a 2 percent (10 percent × 20
percent) minimum wage hike for the whole metropolitan area. We will, then, define the
“restaurant-weighted state minimum wage change” (RSMW) as,
(1)

∆𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑚𝑤𝑖𝑡∗ ) =  ∑𝑠 𝜆𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ ∆𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑚𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑡 )

where i is the metropolitan area, s is the state, t is the month, ist is the proportion of restaurants
from state s in month t in metropolitan area i, and mwst is the minimum wage change in state s in
time t.14
When a metropolitan area includes only a single state, ist will equal 1 and the RSMW for
any minimum wage will simply be the change in the associated state minimum wage. The
14

For example, consider the District of Columbia in 2009. That series is composed partly of counties in
Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia. Factoring in the number of restaurant establishments in each of these
subsamples of counties as a percent of the total establishments in those counties gives the following weight to apply
to each state’s minimum wage in order to construct the District of Columbia minimum wage variable: D.C. (0.164),
Maryland (0.344), Virginia (0.471), West Virginia (0.020). Thus, if Maryland increased its minimum wage in
January 2009 by 10 percent, this would be a full metropolitan area equivalent minimum wage change of 3.44%
(=10% × 0.344). We tentatively propose, in this case, that a 10percent increase in the minimum wage in Maryland
would have the same impact on prices in the wider District of Columbia metropolitan area as would a 3.44 percent
increase in the federal minimum wage. We believe that this is the best way of addressing this complication in the
price series data. As a check to our strategy, we ran our main regressions with a subsample of series that only
contain data from a single state (such as San Francisco, Los Angeles, Atlanta, and Detroit). The coefficients in these
regression results do not differ substantially from the ones based on the full sample.
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number of restaurant establishments in the various state subsections of multistate metropolitan
areas comes from County Business Patterns, while information about the particular towns and
cities included in each state subsection of a metropolitan area comes from the definitions of these
metropolitan areas provided by the Office of Management and Budget.15
An additional noteworthy characteristic of our data is that some of the price series are
available monthly while other price series are only available bimonthly. (The same holds true for
the data used on Aaronson [2001] and related studies.) Table 4 breaks down the total number of
binding minimum wage hikes in our sample by whether the affected price series reports monthly
or bimonthly observations.
As can be seen, the monthly price series has connected with them a range of federal and
state minimum wage increases, but the number of monthly observations is much less than the
number of observations we have for the bimonthly data. Good reason exists, then, to use the
information included in the bimonthly data in this study as it permits us to take into account a far
wider range of minimum wage increases. Yet, the bimonthly data is not granular enough to
permit a consideration of details about the dynamic (here, monthly) impact of the pricing process
set in motion by a minimum wage hike.
Our data set and approach can be summarized as follows. We estimate price pass-through
due to the minimum wage by using the food away from home price index for 28 cities between
1978 and 2015. In the regressions, we also include each city’s CPI-All as a control variable.
Since some city data is in fact composed of information from multiple states, we incorporate
The BLS’s Handbook on Methods, Chapter 17, describes in general terms the way that they select outlets
to use as their source of prices. The BLS attempts to select these outlets so they reflect where people are buying their
food. We use the regional distribution of restaurant establishments as a proxy for the regional distribution of
restaurant purchases. This is an imperfect proxy as regional differences in restaurant sizes and regional differences
in average consumer restaurant bills might lead the distribution of restaurant purchases to vary from the regional
distribution of restaurant establishments. We also used population weights in place of restaurant establishment
weights, but the results we got from using population weights did not different much from what we reported in the
text.
15
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additional minimum wage changes into our analysis. We apply a weighting scheme to our
minimum wage change variable that draws on County Business Pattern data on the number of
restaurant establishments in each city’s sample area. We use series that are reported both
monthly and bimonthly. In the following section, we discuss our empirical model and present
preliminary results using monthly data.

ESTIMATES OF PASS-THROUGH WITH MONTHLY DATA
Our two initial tasks are to 1) estimate the extent of pass-through and 2) discover when
this pass-through occurs (i.e., either only contemporaneously with the imposition of the
minimum wage hike or also in the months before and/or after the hike is imposed). We can
accomplish both these tasks simultaneously if we limit ourselves to monthly price series only. As
Allegretto and Reich (2015) note as well, the bimonthly price series are not granular enough to
reveal the detailed monthly dynamics of the pass-through process and so we temporarily set the
bimonthly series aside. The downside of this approach is that we are only able to consider the
impact of 82 of the 354 minimum wage hikes appearing in our full sample (see Table 4) and
limit ourselves to using less than half the total observations that we have available.
The subsample used in this section comes from the three metropolitan areas (New York,
Chicago, and Los Angeles) that have monthly data for the entire period and from three additional
metropolitan areas (San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Detroit) that have monthly data for some
subset of the period 1978–2015. Monthly observations were reported for San Francisco between
1986 and 1998, for Philadelphia before 1998, and for Detroit before 1987. We do not use the
bimonthly data from these metropolitan areas from outside these years. Together, these
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metropolitan areas account for only about 20 percent of all federal-level minimum wage
increases and about 30 percent of all state-level minimum wage increases in our sample.
We estimate the equation below, which has Food Away from Home (FAFH) inflation as
the dependent variable and, as independent variables, the weighted log difference in the
minimum wage mw* (defined in Equation [1]), overall metropolitan area CPI inflation, along
with metropolitan area, month, and year fixed effects as independent variables:
(2)

∆ log(𝐹𝐴𝐹𝐻)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑4𝑡=−4 𝛽𝑡 × ∆log(𝑚𝑤𝑖𝑡∗ ) + 𝜃 × log(𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡

This regression includes leads and lags of four months as we want to capture the impact
of a minimum wage hike on prices in the months both preceding and following the month on
which a minimum wage hike is implemented. City-level fixed effects (ci) absorb time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity in FAFH inflation between different cities, and city-level inflation is
included as a control. Controls for month and year are included as well.
Table 5 reports our findings. As we go from regression 1 to regression 3, we add month
and year dummies along with the metropolitan area’s overall CPI as controls. Regression 3 is
used as the basis for the discussion below.
In regression 3 the contemporary elasticity is 0.039, a value that is statistically significant
at the 99 percent confidence level. We also get a statistically significant negative coefficient four
months before the minimum wage is imposed, but no other coefficients achieve statistical
significance in either regression 2 or 3.16 According to the monthly data, then, a minimum wage
hike leads to a price increase only in the month it is imposed. In that month, a 10 percent increase
16
The finding that only a single lead or lag in regressions 2 or 3 achieves statistical significance is evidence
against the potential claim of endogeneity—i.e., that minimum wage policy is partly a response to inflation. Because
the dependent variable is the percentage change in FAFH prices, a potential endogeneity problem reflects the idea
that minimum wage hikes occur during periods of escalating inflation. The fact that the majority of coefficients for
the leads and lags are not statistically significant from zero indicates that this sort of endogeneity is not an issue in
our regressions.
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in the minimum wage is associated with a 0.39 percent increase in the FAFH CPI. We also find
that prices also grow slower four months ahead of a minimum wage hike, as indicated by the
statistically significant (p-value of 0.015) coefficient of -0.014 for T-4. When we take into
consideration the net effect on prices over the 9-month period centered on the minimum wage
hike, we find a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage leads to a net increase in FAFH CPI of
0.25 percent.17
These findings are different from what Aaronson (2001) reported. For instance, he reports
statistically significant price increases in the month before and the month after a minimum wage
hike is imposed whereas we find no such effect in those months. Aaronson also reports a much
larger pass-through effect than we do: he finds that in the 9 months surrounding a minimum
wage hike a 10 percent increase boosts prices by 0.67 percent.18 Our finding of 0.25 percent is
less than half of what Aaronson found. We will defer further comment on these differences until
we discover what our full sample (including both monthly and bimonthly data) says about these
differences.
We have one interesting finding in common with Aaronson (2001): we both find a
statistically significant negative coefficient four months in advance of a minimum wage hike.
The elasticities we find are nearly identical, −0.014 for us and −0.013 for Aaronson.19 That
prices grow slower in advance of a minimum wage is hard to square with a perfectly competitive
setting, in which businesses only respond to actual changes in costs. Further, that an anticipated
increase in future costs might lead to a moderating of price increases ahead of this increase is
quite interesting and we can only speculate about the mechanism behind this behavior. If this

17

However, note that this effect is not statistically significant.
Aaronson (2001, Table 4, regression 2)
19
Aaronson (2001,Table 4, regression 2). Aaronson has little to say about this statistically significant
coefficient.
18
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finding—of slower growth in prices in advance of a minimum wage increase—is confirmed by
regressions using our full sample, one implication might be that studies of the impact of the
minimum wage (either on prices or even on employment) that limit their focus to a couple of
months before and after the minimum wage hike might be missing part of the response they are
trying to measure. This was one of the major claims made by Allegretto and Reich (2015) as
well, in their recent discussion of the price pass-through literature.

USING INTERPOLATED DATA
We now join our monthly and bimonthly series to create a larger single data set. By
combining these two types of data, we expand the number of minimum wage changes we
account for from 82 to 354. The first step is transforming, through a process of interpolation, the
underlying bimonthly data into monthly series before that data is log-transformed and joined
with the log-transformed values of the monthly series. The combination of data increases the
number of observations from 1,852 to 8,124.20
In much of the econometric literature, interpolation involves creating monthly data from
quarterly data or creating quarterly data from yearly data (Gordon and Krenn 2010).
20

The 8,124 observations include 1852 monthly observations, 3,136 bimonthly observations, and 3,136
interpolated “observations.” (Technically, the latter are not observations as they have been partly generated from our
bimonthly data.) The degrees of freedom used to calculate standard error in regressions using this data will be less
than the number of observations. In general, the degrees of freedom are equal to the number of independent pieces
of information that goes into the estimation of a parameter. Some of our interpolated data are not independent, as
they have been generated from a linear combination of the bimonthly data on either side of it and, so, such
interpolated data do not add independent information. However, some of our interpolated data might be seen as
adding new information. For instance, when we generate a monthly observation for January by interpolating
bimonthly FAFH data for December and February, in some cases we add to this observation new information, for
instance that a minimum wage hike occurred in January. Arguably, the latter type of interpolated data does add some
new information, and so it might be seen to add an additional degree of freedom to our regression procedures. Yet,
this new information is embedded in some not-new information (the interpolated part). We take the conservative
approach by assuming that none of the interpolated data contribute degrees of freedom to our estimates of standard
errors. So, for instance, if a regression uses the largest data set (8,124 observations) we will use 4,988 (=1852 +
3136) as the starting point for our determination of the degrees of freedom for the standard errors for the coefficients
for these regressions.
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Interpolation often involves using related higher frequency data to inform the process (e.g.,
Chow and Lin [1971]). In our study, the frequency change is much smaller (from bimonthly to
monthly), and we transform the data in a setting in which no related higher frequency data exists.
Therefore, we interpolate by simply averaging the neighboring bimonthly data and, where
appropriate, splicing information about the minimum wage hikes that occurred
(contemporaneously, with leads or with lags) onto the interpolated monthly series.
Any interpolation process creates something akin to measurement error in the resulting
interpolated data points. In our case, by interpolating values for some metropolitan areas for
FAFH CPI and City CPI-All, we must treat the dependent variable and one independent variable
as if they were measured with error. This raises the possibility that both the coefficients and
standard errors produced by regressions using this data are biased. The precise nature of these
biases will depend, of course, on the nature of the measurement error and the particular
estimation technique used. We will consider each in turn.
Interpolation will likely generate “pseudo-measurement” errors for FAFH CPI that are
positive both for the month preceding a minimum wage hike (T − 1) and for the month following
such hikes (T + 1). Interpolation will also likely generate pseudo-measurement errors that are
negative for the month of a minimum wage hike. The argument that the pseudo-measurement
errors have these signs (on average) is simple. First, we assume that the impact of minimum
wages on prices in a metropolitan area is unrelated to whether the BLS collects monthly or
bimonthly FAFH CPI data for that metropolitan area. If that is the case, we can use the results of
our monthly regressions above to say that in metropolitan areas that collect bimonthly data,
minimum wage hikes lead to increases in prices on the month of the hike but not in the month
before or after.
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The upper half of Figure 1 portrays a stylized pattern of FAFH prices when a minimum
wage hike is imposed in a particular metropolitan area. In this figure, we presume prices grow
smoothly except for in the month of the minimum wage hike (on month 0), when it jumps up due
to the minimum wage. We identify four of the actual prices as a, b, c, and d. But suppose that the
BLS collects data on a bimonthly basis in the metropolitan area, and does so on month −2, month
0, month +2 and so on. That is, the price data collected includes a and c (but does not include b).
The data for b must be estimated from the known data a and c. If we linearly interpolate between
a and c (indicated by the plus sign) we can see our interpolated value for b, the price level at
month −1, to exceeds the actual data point b. As a result of this, the growth rate in FAFH prices
from month −2 to month −1 generated from this interpolated data will be larger than it really is
while that from month −1 to month 0 will be smaller than it really is. If, on the other hand, we
have bimonthly data for months −1 and +1, then the interpolated data point for month 0 will be
lower than it really is, and as a result the growth rate of FAFH prices from −1 to 0 will be lower
than it really is and from 0 to +1 the growth rate of prices will be higher than it really is. If we
have a mix of the two types of bimonthly data, and generate a monthly series for the growth of
FAFH prices, then this will tend to create, in regressions that use this interpolated data, upward
biases for the coefficients for T − 1 and T + 1 and a downward bias for T = 0. Interpolation,
when prices do jump on the month of a minimum wage increase, shifts the apparent price
increases away from the month in which it was imposed onto both the month before and the
month after. The same shifting, for the same reason, will occur from T − 4 to T − 3 because of
the positive coefficient for T − 4 in the monthly regressions above.21

21

Pseudo-measurement errors might also be correlated with our monthly dummies because of predictable
seasonal movements of prices. If prices typically grow rapidly in, say, April and we interpolate between February
and April CPI data points then the interpolated value for March will tend to be greater than it really is as will the
resulting value for the grow rate of prices in March. Similarly, the growth rate of prices between March and April,
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We now turn to the second issue: the impact of the interaction between the particular data
we use in this study and the particular estimation technique we use. We gain insight into the
consequences of interpolating the bimonthly data by, again, making use of our monthly data. We
note that how restaurants respond to minimum wage hikes should not depend on whether the
BLS generates monthly or bimonthly FAFH CPI series for their metropolitan area. This suggests
the following experiment: for the metropolitan areas that do have monthly data, we can simulate
what the data would have been if it actually had been collected bimonthly and then use this data
to run our regressions. We can then compare the regression results generated from this simulated
bimonthly data with the results produced by the true monthly data. The differences we discover
in this experiment using fabricated bimonthly data should be transferable to metropolitan areas
for which we have only bimonthly data.
We then return to the six series for which we have full monthly data, deleting half of each
city’s FAFH and CPI-All observations, and then linearly interpolating each series to create
observations to replace those we deleted. For half of the series we delete the
December/February/April/… FAFH price index observations, and for the other half we delete the
January/March/May/... observations. We then logged and first-differenced each of the fabricated
bimonthly (with interpolation) series to obtain our measure of inflation, and estimated a
regression model based on Equation (2).
Regression 4 in Table 6 reports the result of using the fabricated bimonthly (with
interpolation) data. As predicted above, interpolation spreads out the contemporaneous impact of
the minimum wage hike to the month preceding and the month following the hike. As we move
from regression 3 (from Table 5) to regression 4, the contemporaneous impact falls from 0.039
using the interpolated data, will be downward biased. If this seasonal issue does occur, our monthly coefficients
might be systematically biased. But this additional factor does not affect the estimated coefficients for the variables
of interest to us in this study and, so we ignore it here.
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to 0.021 while the coefficients for T − 1 and T + 1 rise (and achieve significance or nearsignificance). The sum of the coefficients for T − 1 to T + 1 is identical in regressions 3 and 4.
Once we get to the sum of T − 4 to T + 4, that for regression 4 does exceed that for regression 3
but this increase is due mostly to what happened for T + 4. In most, but not all, cases the
standard errors fell but the magnitude of these changes were not large enough to (alone) cause
estimated coefficients to achieve significance.22
In summary, interpolation in the context of this study tends to reduce the estimated
contemporaneous price increase, shifts some of the contemporaneous impact to the months
before and after the minimum wage hike, and should be assumed to reduce standard errors. Still,
when interpreted carefully, a regression using some interpolated data does provide useful
information about the total effect of minimum wage hikes on the FAFH CPI.
Although we cannot say for sure what caused Aaronson (2001) to find statistically
significant increases in prices in month before and after minimum wage hikes, the above
discussion about the impact of interpolation suggests that Aaronson’s results were at least partly
(and maybe fully) due to his use of interpolated bimonthly data for the majority of the series he
used.
For comparison, regression 5 in Table 6 presents the results using data coming only from
those metropolitan areas for which the BLS generates bimonthly price data. No monthly data
were used. The regressions were generating from series using bimonthly (with interpolation)
data. For some cities, the BLS releases their FAFH price index on a January/March/May/…
cycle, while others follow the alternate cycle of December/February/April/…. In order to
estimate elasticities using these series, we linearly interpolated the original FAFH price index as
22

The reason why not all standard errors fall is because we use Huber-White robust standard errors, which
(by correcting for arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity) may end up increasing or decreasing standard errors. When
Huber-White standard errors are not used, all standard errors due to interpolation are lower than the baseline case.
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well as the city CPI-All. This new series, now made up of a combination of the actual bimonthly
data and data interpolated between the bimonthly data, was logged and first-differenced to
construct the measure of FAFH inflation that serves as our dependent variable.
The results seen in regression 5 are very similar to those seen in regression 4, but with
greater significance on certain coefficients possibly due to the higher number of observations
used to estimate regression 5. One difference seen is that the slowdown in the price increase
(ahead of the minimum wage hike) shifted forward one month to T − 3. The various sums of
coefficients are very similar to those found in regressions 3 and 4.
The results of regression 5 are exactly what one would expect if the true underlying
monthly data (if it existed) were just like that which generated the results in regression 3. When
properly interpreted, the results of regressions using interpolated data give insight into the impact
of minimum wage hikes on prices. We turn next to combining monthly and bimonthly (with
interpolation) data to consider the impact of minimum wage hikes along with other issues
relevant to policy design.

MAIN RESULTS: HOW DO PRICES RESPOND? ARE THE RESULTS CONSISTENT
WITH PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE LOW-WAGE LABOR MARKETS?
We now pool together monthly and bimonthly (interpolated) data for the 1978–2015
period. Table 7 presents the results. We focus on the results of regression 7, which includes City
CPI-All as a control.
According to regression 7, a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage boosts prices by
0.45 percent in the three months centered on the month the hike is imposed. However, based on
the discussion in the previous section, we can say that regression 7 likely overstates the size of
the price increases on the month before and after the minimum wage hike is imposed and
19

understates the size of the price increase on the month the hike is actually imposed, though the
sum of these coefficients likely does indicate the full impact of these three months. The sum of
the coefficients [T − 1, T + 1] in this regression, 0.045, is almost identical to that found in
regression 3 (which used only monthly data).23
As before, we also find minimum wage hikes lead restaurants to moderate their price
increases 3 to 4 months ahead of the hike. In regression 7, the coefficients for T − 3 and T − 4
are both negative and statistically significant. A portion of the price decline assigned to T − 3 in
this regression is likely due to a shifting of price increases occurring in T − 4 by the process of
interpolation. The sum of the coefficients for these two months is 0.015, which is identical the
sum of coefficients of the same two months in regressions 3 and 5.
The total effect of minimum wage hikes in the nine months centered on the month the
hike is imposed is 0.036, a number close to that seen in regression 5 but somewhat larger than
seen in regression 3. So, considering the full period over which a minimum wage affects prices,
we find that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage leads to a 0.36 percent net increase in
prices. That is, if a $10.00 item experienced this average price increase, it would become a
$10.04 item.
The size of the price increase (and so the implied welfare loss to consumers) we find is
lower than previously reported: Aaronson (2001) reports a 10 percent increase in the minimum
wage causes a net 0.67 percent increase in the nine months centered on the month the minimum
wage hike is imposed.24 We find a price increase for the same period close to half of that

23

Although the interpolation process generates standard errors that are biased downwards (as discussed
above), the p-values for most of these coefficients in regression 7 are so small that it is hard to believe that the
reported statistical significance was due simply to interpolation.
24
Aaronson (2001, Table 4, regression 2, p. 162).
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reported by Aaronson (0.36 percent vs. 0.67 percent), and so our findings suggest a lower
welfare loss to consumers following a minimum wage hike.
The importance of our findings goes beyond finding a reduced welfare impact on
consumers when a minimum wage hike is imposed. Building on a set of reasonable assumptions
about the operation of restaurants in a hypothetical perfectly competitive market, Aaronson and
French (2007) argue that restaurants in perfectly competitive markets will fully pass through any
increase in the minimum wage and that the full pass-through elasticity will be equal to
approximately 0.07. Since they find, in various regressions, elasticities near 0.07, they conclude
that low-wage restaurant labor markets are best characterized as perfectly competitive. The
implication of being in a perfectly competitive market is that any minimum wage increase will
reduce employment.
However, we get results inconsistent with highly competitive low-wage labor markets in
the restaurant industry: our elasticity of 0.036 for the nine months centered on the month of a
minimum wage hike and of 0.043 for the much narrower period of [T − 1,T + 1] fall short of the
0.07 Anderson and French (2009) argue is consistent with perfect competition. However, our
finding that the pass-through falls short of that implied by perfect competition does not provide
positive support for any particular alternative structure of low-wage labor markets. In the next
section, we consider whether the data we have provide positive support for one alternative labor
market structure, monopsonistic competition.
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MONOPSONISTIC COMPETITION IN LOW-WAGE LABOR MARKETS: THEORY
AND EVIDENCE
Monopsonistic competition has been offered in recent years as an alternative model for
some labor markets.25 Most notably, Card and Krueger (1995) proposed that monopsony-like
conditions in low-wage labor markets might explain their finding that minimum wages increased
employment. Since then, Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Bhaskar and To (1999), Bhaskar,
Manning, and To (2002) have proposed different causes for imperfect competition on the buyerside of labor markets, and developed formal models that drew out the potential consequences of
monopsonistic competition. All of these formal models of monopsonistic competition, however,
generate results that are consistent with Stigler’s (1946) observation of the impact of a minimum
wage when businesses have market power in labor markets: the impact of a minimum wage on
employment (and so on output prices) is context dependent. More narrowly, Stigler pointed out
that when employers had power over wages, a small rise in a minimum wage generates increased
employment (and, implied by this, increased output and reduced prices) while a large increase in
the minimum wage reduces employment (and, by implication, reduces output and raises prices).
This is seen in the standard model of monopsony in the labor market. The monopsonist
has market power and, therefore, faces an upward-sloping labor supply curve. To attract more
workers, the monopsonist needs to increase the wage, which necessitates increasing the wages of
those already hired. This implies the marginal cost of labor for the monopsonist is greater than
the wage, and so the marginal cost of labor curve is upward sloping and rises faster than the
labor supply curve.
25
Few argue that pure monopsony in labor markets has been found outside of a few unusual labor markets
(for instance, in the market for professional baseball players in the United States before the ending of the reserve
clause). Many economists, however, persist in using the term monopsony as shorthand for monopsonistic
competition. Bhaskar, Manning, and To (2002) review the empirical work associated with monopsonistic
competition, while Staiger, Spetz, and Phibbs (2010) show strong evidence of monopsonistic competition in the
nursing labor market.
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In Figure 2A, the equilibrium wage for the monopsonist, in the absence of a minimum
wage, is at Wm while employment stands at Lm. This equilibrium wage is below what it would
have been in a perfectly competitive setting, Wpc.
Figure 2B shows the impact of a “small” minimum wage increase. Suppose, just for the
sake of convenience, that initially the minimum wage stood at Wm. Next, suppose that a new
minimum wage is implemented and the size of the increase is small. The new minimum wage is
established at Wsmw, which stands above Wm but below Wx, where labor supply equals labor
demand. The marginal cost of labor now includes the horizontal solid line starting at Wsmw. The
new marginal cost curve will induce the monopsonist to expand employment up to Lsmw as each
worker below that level of employment will now have a marginal cost below his/her value of
marginal product (given by the labor demand curve). As drawn, the small increase in the
minimum wage will increase employment (that is, Lsmw > Lm). In turn, this increased employment
will (given plausible assumptions) lead to higher output (at least in the short-run) and, so, will
lower prices.
Figure 2C shows the impact of a “large” increase in the minimum wage. With a large
increase, the minimum wage pushes the wage from Wm to above Wx , and employment falls as
Llmw < Lm. Under reasonable assumptions, this decline in employment is associated with a decline
in output and an increase in prices.
This context-dependent nature of the impact of minimum wage hikes on employment,
output, and prices within monopsony (or monopsonistic competition) contrasts starkly with the
prediction of a model of perfect competition. In perfect competition, an increase in the minimum
wage—no matter what its size—will lead to a price hike that fully passes along the higher labor
costs onto consumers and will cause lower employment and output. Further, the perfectly
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competitive labor market model gives no reason to suppose that the wage-price elasticity would
vary systematically with the size of a minimum wage change: the wage-price elasticity
associated with a small minimum wage increase should not systematically differ from the wageprice elasticity associated with a large minimum wage increase.
Based on this second observation—that the effects of the minimum wage in a perfectly
competitive labor market should not vary depending on the size of the increase—we implement a
rough test of the claim that low-wage labor markets in the restaurant industry are best
characterized this way by seeing whether small increases in minimum wages have a different
effect on FAFH prices than large minimum wage increases. We separate the minimum wage
changes in our sample into two groups, small and large increases depending whether the
minimum wage change is below or above the average minimum wage increase in our sample, 6.8
pecrent. We cannot be sure, of course, that this average is close to Wx in our diagram.
Table 8 (regression 8) presents a regression based on these two types of minimum wage
changes, small and large. The standard controls from regression 7 are used in this regression as
well.
As can be seen, for the small minimum wage hikes a single coefficient achieves statistical
significance, that for [T − 4], and this coefficient is negative. The sum of coefficients for the
months immediately surrounding the small minimum wage increase, [T − 1,T + 1], is also
negative although statistically insignificant. The sum of coefficients for the full nine-month
period surrounding small minimum wage hike, [T − 4,T + 4], is negative and statistically
significant. In contrast to the small increases, the coefficients for large minimum wage hikes are
statistically significant and positive for all of T, [T − 1,T + 1], and [T − 4,T + 4], with elasticities
that closely match the results reported for the full data set in Table 7.This finding—that small
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minimum wage hikes fail to increase prices and, indeed, appear to cause prices to fall—is
inconsistent with the perfectly competitive model. On the other hand, these findings are
consistent with a model of monopsony or monopsonistic competition.26 This finding, however,
should be viewed with some degree of caution because of the effect that interpolation has on
standard errors, thus possibly causing us to reject null hypotheses more often than is warranted.
In summary, while regression 7 provides evidence against perfect competition in low-wage labor
markets, regression 8 provides evidence that such labor markets are either monopsonistic or
monopsonistically competitive.

POLICY CONTEXTS MATTER, SOMETIMES
Minimum wage policies differ along many dimensions. Consider the competitive context.
Most previous studies have either assumed or neglected to explore whether federal, state, and
local minimum wage hikes all have equal effects on prices and employment. Most national level
studies treat all minimum wages—city, state, or federal—as if they had the same impact on
prices, as measured by elasticities. State- or city-level studies similarly assume that their results
can be generalized to other minimum wage hikes. But the equivalency of federal, state, and city
minimum wage hikes must be tested and not merely assumed. The most obvious potential
difference between federal, state, and local minimum wage hike is the competitive context. For
instance, we might treat a federal minimum wage hike, as far as the restaurant industry goes, as
if it was implemented in a closed economy: cross-national trade and capital mobility relevant to
the restaurant industry is relatively unimportant. On the other extreme, we might treat a city
minimum wage increase as if it occurred in an open economy: the movement of restaurants and
26

While our results are consistent with either monopsony or monopsonistic competition, we follow
Bhaskar and To (1999), who argue that the latter is a more realistic model of unskilled labor markets.
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customers across the city boundary to or from a neighboring area could be large enough to affect
the magnitude of the price increase seen in the area implementing a minimum wage hike.27
A second dimension is timing. A law could provide for a single, large increase in the
minimum wage or it could provide for a series of smaller, annual increases with no ending date.
The former was common for most of the history of the minimum wage, while the latter are
becoming increasingly common at the state and local level. The impact on prices and
employment of these two laws might be different. The latter type of law—implementing a
perpetual series of possibly small annual increases—permits more long-term planning by
businesses and that, in turn, might lead to different consequences for prices, employment, and
output. In addition, as indicated above, a small increase in a minimum wage appears less likely
to generate higher prices, and by implication lower employment, than a larger increase—
suggesting that indexation might be an effective means of reducing pass-through and other
effects.
In this section, we first consider whether the competitive context matters for the level of
pass-through. We then consider whether timing has systematic effects on the level of passthrough.

COMPETITIVE CONTEXT: FEDERAL VS. STATE VS. CITY MINIMUM WAGE
HIKES
A minimum wage hike might induce cross-border movement of restaurants. If the cost of
capital mobility is low, some restaurants might exit the area increasing the minimum wage as
27
Restaurant meals are much closer to a pure service then they are to a tradable good. While home delivery
of meals can cross borders (city, state, or even international) much like a good, the delivery area is typically quite
small. Similarly, customers can, and do, travel many miles for restaurant meals (perhaps, again, crossing borders),
but typically the distance travelled is far shorter than a good would be if shipped across a border. Our discussion of
the impact of a minimum wage hike on prices is therefore only relevant to an industry like the near-pure-service
restaurant industry, and not necessarily relevant for minimum wage hikes that affect goods-producing industries.
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they seek higher profits in an area that has not increased its minimum wage. Similarly, if the cost
of transportation for consumers is low, and restaurant prices grew as a response to a minimum
wage hike, some consumers might seek now-relatively cheaper restaurant meals outside the area
that had boosted its minimum wage.28
The joint effect of these two processes on prices will be ambiguous. When capital
mobility cost and transportation cost (relevant to consumers) are both low, the exit of restaurants
should shift the supply curve for restaurant meals upward (that is, further than caused by the
minimum wage hike alone), while the now-available relatively lower-cost restaurant meals in
other areas should cause the demand for restaurant meals (in the area that imposed the new,
higher minimum wage) to become more elastic than previously was the case. We cannot say,
then, that the price rise following a minimum wage hike will be larger or smaller when the costs
of capital mobility and transportation are low. We cannot know a priori the net effect of the
consequences of cross-border movement of businesses and of customers; it is an empirical
matter.
The costs of capital mobility and consumer transportation should be highest in the case of
a federal minimum wage hike. The average restaurant or consumer in the United States will
likely perceive the cost of moving to another country, seeking to open a new restaurant or
seeking a relatively cheaper restaurant meal, as being prohibitively high. On the other extreme,
some restaurants operating in a city that has increased its minimum wage might possibly believe
the cost of moving outside the city is low enough to make such a move reasonable. Similarly,
some consumers who normally buy a restaurant meal within the city raising its minimum wage
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Cross-border movement of labor is also possible but we believe such movement would have only a small
effect, if any, on output prices following a minimum wage hike as the minimum wage would keep an influx of
workers from pushing down wages.
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might seek lower-cost meals outside the city. The state case might be between the federal and the
city case.
Regression 9 in Table 9 shows the results of separating federal, state, and city minimum
wage hikes. If the combined effects of capital mobility and transportation costs systematically
vary between federal, state, and city minimum wages, we might see different elasticities for the
three different types of minimum wages.
This regression fails to provide evidence that federal and state minimum wage hikes have
differing effects on restaurant prices. While the effect, for all periods from T to [T − 4,T + 4], of
federal minimum wage hikes on prices is larger than that of state hikes, none of these differences
achieve statistical significance (according to F-tests). Noteworthy, however, is that the estimated
effect of state minimum wages on prices is smaller than the federal impact as this is contrary to
what would be the case if businesses fled states that imposed minimum wage hikes.29 Further,
regression 9 reveals that although the total effect of a federal minimum wage hike on prices over
the period [T − 4, T + 4] is positive, this effect is not statistically significant due to the
statistically significant negative effect on prices three and four months ahead of the federal
minimum wage hike. We do not see such negative effects on prices in the case of state minimum
wage hikes.
The results of regression 9 suggest that city minimum wage hikes differ from both federal
and state hikes. The total impact on prices of a city hike over [T − 4,T + 4] is not only much
larger than that seen in the case of federal and state hikes (0.086 vs. 0.033 and 0.025), the
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A possible criticism of this analysis is that for some minimum wage increases we will not be able to
capture evidence of business flight because the affected series samples from several states. Thus, for the New York
City price series, a firm affected by a minimum wage increase in New York may move to a part of New Jersey that
is still sampled in the New York City price series. Thus, no effect would be registered in the New York City series.
To address this criticism, as a robustness check we ran a second regression that restricted our sample to series that
only contain samples from a single state. The results of this second regression did not differ much from that reported
above.
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positive impact on prices is more spread out over the months surrounding the month on which it
was implemented. Whereas the federal minimum wage hike is associated with negative effects
on prices in T − 3 and T − 4, a city hike is associated with positive effects on these months.
While we can’t be sure what the exact causes are for these higher elasticities for city minimum
wage hikes, they are consistent with the exit of businesses from a city that has implemented a
minimum wage hike. However, we are hesitant to draw out too much from these city results
because they are dominated by minimum wage hikes implemented in San Francisco which, as
we discuss below, is a special case and might require somewhat that we use a somewhat different
methodology to discover the true impact of city minimum wage hikes on output prices. We will
hold off, therefore, on any firm statements about whether city minimum wage hikes truly have
greater impact on prices, and also about whether these results are or are not consistent with the
exit of restaurants from cities implementing minimum wage hikes.
One tentative conclusion does seem appropriate: the above results suggest that it might be
wrong to presume that federal, state, and city minimum wage hikes all have the same effect on
prices. Both the size of the effect and how price increases and decreases are distributed over time
might differ between federal, state, and city minimum wage hikes.

SPECIAL CASE: CITY MINIMUM WAGE HIKES
The results of regression 9 indicate that city-level minimum wage hikes are different
cases than federal or state hikes and that perhaps we need to use a different approach to study
city minimum wage hikes. In this section, we outline an approach that compares price changes in
those cities that experienced a minimum wage change to a reference group of cities that did not
experience a minimum wage increase in that same month.
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Two series in our sample implemented their own minimum wage laws: Washington,
D.C., and San Francisco. We have good reason to believe that San Francisco represents a unique
case that requires special treatment. San Francisco is the only city that has indexed its minimum
wage increases to yearly increases in the local—i.e., city—CPI, making wage-price elasticities
especially difficult to estimate because of the potential two-way influence between minimum
wage hikes and city inflation. Furthermore, a strong housing market, a robust tourism industry,
and the rise of Silicon Valley have all led to unusually high rates of increase in the cost of living
and in restaurant prices in particular in the San Francisco area. On top of that, in 2008 San
Francisco implemented a health care ordinance that directly increased the costs of the restaurant
industry, and this policy possibly had its own effect on restaurant prices in the city by further
increasing labor costs. One could also argue that Washington, D.C., is also unique for its tourism
industry, presence of a large group of young professional workers and public officials, and
overall strong demand in the restaurant industry.
For these reasons, we adopt an “event study” approach where we compare FAFH
inflation in these two cities in the month of a minimum wage increase to the average FAFH
inflation in all other cities that did not see a minimum wage increase in that month. The “events”
include all the months of minimum wage increases in both cities plus the months in which there
was a change in costs in San Francisco due to the health care ordnance (the first increase was in
April 2008, with subsequent increases in January of each year—these increases are thus added
on top of the yearly increases in the minimum wage). Previous studies of citywide mandates
have used a similar approach where it is convenient to compare a single case to a plausible
reference group (Allegretto and Reich 2015; Dube, Naidu, and Reich 2007; Colla et al. 2014).
The pass-through effects are modeled in Equation (3) below, with dummy variables mw_changeit
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indicating the month t that a minimum wage affects Washington, D.C., or San Francisco, and
dummy variables mw_referenceit indicating cities i that, in that same month t, did not experience
a minimum wage increase. We include leads and lags of four months for consistency with the
results reported in other tables.
(3)

∆ log(𝐹𝐴𝐹𝐻)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑4𝑡=−4 𝛿𝑡 × 𝑚𝑤𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑆.𝐹.𝑜𝑟𝐷.𝐶.,𝑡 + ∑4𝑡=−4 𝛾𝑡 ×
𝑚𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃 × log(𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 

The overall effect of the minimum wage change in a particular city can then be calculated by
subtracting γt from δt for each t. The results are reported in regression 10.
The cumulative T − 1 through T + 1 coefficient is 0.0028 for San Francisco (p-value of
0.0624) and 0.0014 for Washington, D.C., though the latter is not significant (p-value of 0.2085).
Since the cumulative coefficient for the reference group is −0.0006, this implies an overall effect
for San Francisco of about 0.0031, or a 0.31 percent increase in FAFH prices relative to cities
that did not see a minimum wage increase. If we compare the cumulative T − 4 through T + 4
effects instead, the effect for San Francisco and Washington, D.C., after accounting for the
behavior of the reference group, rises very slightly to 0.32 percent and 0.28 percent, respectively.
This suggests that there are no significant increases in the average price level in either city that
occur more than 1 or 2 months outside the month of a minimum wage hike (for example, the
T − 4 and T − 3 coefficients for San Francisco indicate a 0.09 percent and
−0.01 percent change in the average price level, respectively).
While our results appear to be consistent with the main wage-price elasticities reported in
Table 7, recall that those elasticities are based on a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage.
Because of indexation, increases in San Francisco’s minimum wage have recently been much
less than 10 percent (the large initial increase in January 2004 is the exception). In other words,
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this coefficient suggests a slightly larger pass-through effect than what was found in the main
results. The lack of significance for the case of Washington, D.C., at even an alpha of 10 percent
suggests that our findings for San Francisco are more a reflection of the unique aspects of the
Bay Area than necessarily a response of prices to a city-level minimum wage hike.30
In sum, the event study approach adopted in this section suggests that the pass-through
effect for city-level minimum wage hikes might vary by the city imposing the hike, and that the
growth of prices even in San Francisco is not obviously greater than that seen in the case of
federal or state minimum wage hikes. The slightly higher and statistically significant elasticities
found for San Francisco likely have more to do with the uniqueness of the Bay Area described
above. Further, by singling out the one city that has indexed its minimum wage changes to
changes in the city CPI, we address concerns that indexation could lead to artificially high price
increases due to a back-and-forth effect between higher labor costs passing through to higher
prices, leading to higher labor costs, and so on. The lack of any sustained increases in the
average price level further out (i.e., beyond one or two months before and after a minimum wage
increase) suggests that indexation of the minimum wage to the local CPI did not lead to any
sustained inflationary effects in San Francisco.

INDEXED VS. SCHEDULED VS. ONE-SHOT
The different competitive context discussed above—the costs associated with capital
mobility and consumer transportation—does not exhaust the potentially relevant differences that

Some of the coefficients outside of the T − 1 to T + 1 range are also significant, but in all of these cases,
we argue that they are not economically significant. For example, the coefficient for T − 3 in the Washington, D.C.,
case is significant, but after accounting for the inflation in the reference cases for that month, the measured impact is
minor.
30
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might shape the effect of a minimum wage policy on prices or even employment. We now turn to
the second dimension of recent minimum wage policy that might affect its impact: timing.
Some minimum wage laws have provided for one-shot increases, where at some future
date the minimum wage is increased and the law provides for no further increases. Other
minimum wage laws have provided for a series of increases, perhaps occurring for a few years,
beyond which there are no additional increases. Federal minimum wage laws have been of this
sort. In recent years, however, state and city minimum wage laws have provided for a different
process: perpetual increases that do not end, and are (after an initial set increase) tied to some
cost-of-living index.
We now take advantage of the variation in minimum wage policy caused by indexation to
compare that approach to the traditional minimum wage hike—or the other popular approach of
scheduling that hike across several years (the strategy adopted in most of the federal minimum
wage changes, for example). Since minimum wage increases are usually not voted on or
announced more than a few months before the proposed increase is planned to go into effect,
more predictable changes (due to scheduling or indexation) may allow business owners to better
prepare for and take account of increases in labor costs. Also, more moderate changes (due to
indexation, which—after the initial large increase—generally results in smaller changes in the
minimum wage) could also allow firms to more easily absorb the increase in costs. Reflecting on
the previous findings that two low minimum wage changes are not the same as one high one,
moderation along this dimension could temper the contemporary pass-through effect. At any
rate, since the competitive model would clearly not predict any difference in wage-price
elasticities across different kinds of policies, any evidence of difference may suggest the
presence of noncompetitive elements.
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The results are reported in regression 11 in Table 11, where we compare the cases of
indexed minimum wages, excluding the indexed minimum wage changes San Francisco (for the
reasons discussed above), with “one shot” cases in which the minimum wage increases a single
time, as well as scheduled cases in which the minimum wage increase is spread out over a
number of years. For both scheduled and one-shot cases, the sum of the T − 1 through T + 1
coefficients is significant and much higher than the indexed case. For the indexed case, the sum
of the coefficients is not significant. An F-test of a comparison of the equality of coefficients
across the indexed and scheduled cases provides evidence to support the rejection of the null
hypothesis that the coefficients are the same. These results are consistent with our finding earlier
that moderate minimum wage changes do not lead to significant increases in FAFH prices, and
they provide additional evidence that indexation—if only by mandating regular, small increases
in the minimum wage—may temper the pass-through effect.
Taken together, these results imply that the minimization of pass-through (and
presumably employment and output) effects can be achieved through moderate increases in the
minimum wage that are imposed at the state or federal level. The results from the city-level
minimum wage increases suggest that cross-border competition or other factors make it more
difficult for firms to adjust to changes in labor costs and at the same time make other areas of the
state (or outside the city) more attractive for these same reasons, thereby causing business flight.
Our results also suggest that recent attempts to regionalize minimum wage policy or schedule
increases toward some upper wage limit (such as $15) without any attachment to a cost of living
index may lead to larger economic effects.
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SUMMARY
There are several findings in this paper. First, the impact of minimum wage hikes on
output prices (more precisely, on the FAFH CPI) is substantially smaller than previously
reported. Whereas the commonly accepted elasticity of prices to minimum wage changes is 0.07,
we find a value almost half of that, 0.036. Importantly, the value we found, 0.036, falls far short
of what would be expected if low-wage labor markets are perfectly competitive. Second,
increases in prices following minimum wage hikes generally occur in the month the minimum
wage hike is implemented (and not in the month before or the month after). Previous research
has reported notable increases in prices the month before and the month after, but we present
evidence that such a finding was likely an artifact of interpolation.
Third, the effects of federal, state, and city minimum wages on prices are not necessarily
the same: the size of the effect, along with when the price effect occurs, can potentially change
for these different types of minimum wage policies. Fourth, small minimum wage hikes do not
lead to higher prices, and they might actually lead to lower prices. On the other hand, large
minimum wage hikes have clear positive effects on output prices. Such a finding about the
different effect of small and of large minimum wage hikes is consistent with the claim that lowwage labor markets are monopsonistically competitive. If such labor markets are indeed
monopsonistically competitive, then small increases in minimum wages might lead to increased
employment. Our study of restaurant pricing, then, indirectly addresses one of the more
contentious issues associated with the employment impact of minimum wage hikes. Fifth, we
find no evidence suggesting that exit of restaurants fleeing state minimum wage hikes is large
enough to affect output prices
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Finally, we find evidence that the particulars of a minimum wage policy (indexed, oneshot, scheduled) might affect how price changes occur within the relevant area. These results can
be used to design future minimum wage policies that best temper the pass-through effect.
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Table 1 Characteristics of Minimum Wage Changes Considered in This Study
1978–1997
Characteristic
(Same as Aaronson et al.)
1998–2015
Federal
8
3
State
25
101
City
1
22
Indexed
0
43
One or two in series of increasesa
20
25
Perpetually scheduled
0
21
a Four
b

or fewer consecutive yearly minimum wage increases.
More than four consecutive yearly minimum wage increases (e.g., Connecticut 1999–2004; see Table 2).
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1978–2015 (Total)
11
126
23
43
45
21

Table 2 City-, State-, and Federal-Level Minimum Wage Changes Affecting Cities in Our Sample, 1977–2015
Political unit passing minimum wage Increase
Month/year of increasea
Federal (11 total, leading to 193 binding minimum wage 1/1978, 1/1979, 1/1980, 1/1981, 4/1990, 4/1991, 10/1996,
increases)
9/1997, 8/2007, 8/2008, 8/2009
State (131 total binding minimum wage increases)
Alaska (1978, 1979, 1980, 1981)b
Massachusetts (7/1986, 7/1987, 7/1988, 1/1996, 1/1997,
1/2000, 1/2001, 1/2007, 1/2008, 1/2015)
New Hampshire (1/1987, 1/1988, 1/1989, 1/1990, 1/1991,
9/2007, 9/2008)
Connecticut (10/1987, 10/1988, 1/1999, 1/2000, 1/2001,
1/2002, 1/2003, 1/2004, 1/2006, 1/2007, 1/2009, 1/2010,
1/2014, 1/2015)
Maine (1/2002, 1/2003, 10/2004, 10/2005, 10/2006,
10/2007, 10/2008, 10/2009)
Wisconsin (7/1989, 6/2005, 6/2006)
Illinois (1/2004, 1/2005, 7/2007, 7/2008, 7/2009, 7/2010)
Ohioc (1/2007, 1/2008, 1/2009, 1/2011 1/2012, 1/2013,
1/2014, 1/2015)
West Virginia (7/2006, 7/2007, 7/2008, 1/2015)
Maryland (1/2007, 1/2015)
Michigan (10/2006, 7/2007, 7/2008, 9/2014)
California (7/1988, 3/1997, 3/1998, 1/2001, 1/2002,
1/2007, 1/2008, 7/2014)
Floridad (2/2005, 1/2006, 1/2007, 1/2008, 1/2009, 6/2011,
1/2012, 1/2013, 1/2014, 1/2015)
New Jersey (4/1992, 10/2005, 10/2006, 1/2014, 1/2015)
New York (1/2005, 1/2006, 1/2007, 1/2014, 1/2015)
Pennsylvania (2/1989, 1/2007, 7/2007)
Delaware (4/1996, 1/1997, 5/1999, 10/2000, 1/2007,
1/2008, 6/2014)
Washington (1/1989, 1/1990, 1/1999, 1/2000, 1/2001,
1/2002, 1/2003, 1/2004, 1/2005, 1/2006, 1/2007, 1/2008,
1/2009, 1/2011, 1/2012, 1/2013, 1/2014, 1/2015)
City/county
Washington, D.C. (10/1993, 1/2005, 1/2006, 8/2008,
8/2009, 7/2014)
San Franciscoe (1/2004, 1/2005, 1/2006, 1/2007, 1/2008,
1/2009, 1/2010f, 1/2011, 1/2012, 1/2013, 1/2014, 1/2015)
San Jose (3/2013, 1/2014, 1/2015)
Oakland (3/2015)
Berkeley (10/2014)
a In

some cases, the effective month t of the minimum wage change is shifted to the following month t + 1 because the wage
change did not go into effect until later in month t. We used a cutoff date of the 24th day of the month: any minimum wage
change that occurred on or after that day was assumed to affect prices beginning the following month.
b During these years, Alaska set its minimum wage at $0.50 higher than the federal minimum wage.
c
Starting in 2007, Ohio indexed its minimum wage to the national CPI.
d Starting in 2005, Florida indexed its minimum wage to the South’s regional CPI.
e San Francisco indexes its minimum wage to the city’s CPI.
f While the minimum wage did not increase in San Francisco this year, there was a change to labor costs due to the Health Care
Security Ordinance (an employer spending mandate) that went into effect starting April 2008 (July 2008 for businesses with
20–49 employees), requiring employers to pay at an hourly rate per employee. For more information on the ordinance, see
https://www.wageworks.com/media/179290/2903-SFHCSO-Compliance-Alert.pdf (accessed June 29, 2016). The change in
labor costs resulting from this act has been factored into all relevant years.
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Table 3 Series with Sample Areas in Multiple States
Series for the FAFH price index
Boston
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha
Baltimore-Washington, D.C.
New York City-Northern New Jersey-Long Island
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City

Sample areas used for restaurant weights
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine (starting in 1998),
Connecticut (starting in 1998)
Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin
Washington, D.C., Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia
New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Pennsylvania
(starting in 1998)
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware (starting in 1998),
Maryland (starting in 1998)

NOTE: For the individual counties and towns covered each area, see the sources below. Restaurant establishment data (according
to the individual county and town information) found using the County Business Patterns Census Database:
http://censtats.census.gov/cgi-bin/cbpnaic/cbpsect.pl (accessed June 29, 2016).
SOURCE: “Metropolitan Areas and Components, 1998” (published through the U.S. Census),
http://www.census.gov/population/metro/files/lists/historical/93mfips.txt; 1993 edition:
http://www.census.gov/population/metro/files/lists/historical/83mfips.txt (accessed June 29, 2016).
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Table 4 Minimum Wage Hikes by Series Periodicity
Periodicity
Monthly
Bimonthly
Both

Observations
1,852
3,136
4,988

Federal
40
150
190

Minimum wage hikes
State
Local
42
0
101
21
143
21

NOTE: As noted in the text, most CPI data are reported bimonthly, either on January/March/May/etc. cycles or
February/April/June/etc. cycles.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Monthly Labor Review reports (various years).
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Total
82
272
354

Table 5 Estimates of Pass-Through Using Monthly Data Dependent Variable: FAFH Inflation
(1)
(2)
Minimum wage change
T−4
−0.004
−0.014*
(0.005)
(0.006)
T−3
0.006
0.000
(0.007)
(0.007)
T−2
0.012
0.003
(0.010)
(0.009)
T−1
0.008
−0.002
(0.005)
(0.005)
T
0.052**
0.039**
(0.010)
(0.010)
T+1
0.022**
0.008
(0.008)
(0.008)
T+2
0.012
−0.002
(0.007)
(0.006)
T+3
0.012
−0.002
(0.007)
(0.006)
T+4
0.010
−0.002
(0.006)
(0.005)
[T − 1,T + 1]
[T − 3,T + 3]
[T − 4,T + 4]
City CPI-All

City fixed effects
Month, year controls
Observations
Cities
R2
Adj. R2

(3)
−0.014*
(0.006)
0.000
(0.007)
0.001
(0.009)
−0.001
(0.005)
0.039**
(0.010)
0.008
(0.008)
−0.002
(0.006)
−0.004
(0.006)
−0.002
(0.005)

0.081**
0.121**
0.127**

0.044**
0.043
0.027

0.046**
0.041
0.025

—

—

0.113**
(0.031)

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

1,852
6
0.043
0.036

1,852
6
0.162
0.133

1,852
6
0.170
0.141

NOTE: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Regressions use monthly data from Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York between 1978 and
2015, as well as San Francisco (1987–1997), Detroit (through 1986), and Philadelphia through 1997. The T − 4 coefficient
indicates the partial effect of the minimum wage change on FAFH inflation four months prior to the date of the minimum wage
change. Standard errors corrected for arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review reports (various years).
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Table 6 Illustrating the Effect of Interpolation Dependent Variable: FAFH Inflation
(4)
Minimum wage change
T−4
−0.012 **
(0.004)
T−3
0.001
(0.004)
T−2
0.005
(0.005)
T−1
0.010
(0.006)
T
0.021 **
(0.007)
T+1
0.015 *
(0.007)
T+2
−0.003
(0.005)
T+3
−0.006
(0.004)
T+4
0.005
(0.006)
[T − 1, T + 1]
[T − 3, T + 3]
[T − 4, T + 4]
City CPI-All

City fixed effects
Month, year controls
Observations
Metropolitan areas
R2
Adj. R2

(5)
−0.007
(0.003)
−0.008 **
(0.003)
−0.003
(0.003)
0.013 **
(0.004)
0.017 **
(0.005)
0.015 **
(0.005)
0.002
(0.004)
0.006
(0.004)
0.004
(0.003)

0.046 **
0.043 *
0.036

0.045 **
0.042 **
0.039 **

0.084 **
(0.031)

0.132 **
(0.020)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

1,851
6
0.285
0.260

6,272
25
0.189
0.178

NOTE: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Regression 4 uses monthly data from Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York between 1978 and
2015, as well as San Francisco (1987–1997), Detroit (through 1986), and Philadelphia through 1997, which has been
interpolated. Regression 5 uses interpolated data from all series for which bimonthly data exist and are meant to be shown for the
similarities to the regression 4 results.
The T − 4 coefficient indicates the partial effect of the minimum wage change on FAFH inflation four months prior to the date of
the minimum wage change. Standard errors corrected for arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses. See
Note 20 for degrees of freedom adjustment made to correct for the use of interpolated data.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review reports (various years).
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Table 7 Estimate of Pass-Through, Full Data Set Dependent variable: FAFH inflation
(6)
Minimum wage change
T−4
−0.010 **
(0.003)
T−3
−0.005 *
(0.003)
T−2
0.000
(0.003)
T−1
0.010 **
(0.003)
T
0.022 **
(0.005)
T+1
0.013 **
(0.004)
T+2
0.001
(0.003)
T+3
0.004
(0.003)
T+4
0.002
(0.003)
[T − 1, T + 1]
[T − 3, T + 3]
[T − 4, T + 4]

0.044 **
0.043 **
0.035 **

City CPI-All

City fixed effects
Month, year controls
Observations
Metropolitan areas
R2
Adj. R2

(7)
−0.009 **
(0.003)
−0.006 *
(0.003)
−0.002
(0.003)
0.010 **
(0.003)
0.023 **
(0.005)
0.013 **
(0.004)
0.001
(0.003)
0.003
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
0.045 **
0.043 **
0.036 **

—

0.130 **
(0.017)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

8,124
28
0.170
0.161

8,124
28
0.180
0.171

NOTE: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Regressions 6 and 7 use the full data set (i.e., pooled monthly data with the bimonthly,
interpolated, data).
The T− 4 coefficient indicates the partial effect of the minimum wage change on FAFH inflation four months prior to the date of
the minimum wage change. Standard errors corrected for arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses. See
Note 20 for degrees of freedom adjustment made to correct for use of interpolated data.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review reports (various years).
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Table 8 Estimate of Pass-Through, Full Data Set
Dependent Variable: FAFH Inflation
(8)
Minimum wage change
T−4
T−3
T−2
T−1
T
T+1
T+2
T+3
T+4

Small
−(0.035) *
(0.011)
−0.011
(0.011)
−0.002
(0.011)
−0.011
(0.010)
0.013
(0.013)
−0.005
(0.011)
−0.002
(0.011)
−0.015
(0.011)
−0.001
(0.010)

Large
− (0.007) **
(0.003)
−0.006 *
(0.003)
−0.003
(0.003)
0.011 **
(0.003)
0.023 **
(0.005)
0.014 **
(0.004)
0.001
(0.003)
0.005
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)

−0.003
−0.033
−0.069 *

0.048 **
0.045 **
0.040 **

[T − 1, T + 1]
[T − 3, T + 3]
[T − 4, T + 4]
City CPI-All

0.132**
(0.017)

City fixed effects
Month, year controls

Yes
Yes

Observations
Metropolitan areas
R2
Adj. R2

8,124
28
0.178
0.172

NOTE: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Regression 8 uses the full data set (i.e., the monthly data pooled with the bimonthly interpolated
data).
The T − 4 coefficient indicates the partial effect of the minimum wage change on FAFH inflation four months prior to the date of
the minimum wage change. Standard errors corrected for arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses. See
Note 20 for degrees of freedom adjustment made to correct for use of interpolated data.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review reports (various years).
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Table 9 Pass-Through Effects by Policy Context Dependent Variable: FAFH Inflation
(9)
Minimum wage change
Federal
State
City
T−4
0.008 *
−0.014 **
−0.001
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.003)
T−3
0.008 *
−0.008 *
−0.003
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.003)
T−2
0.009
−0.001
−0.006
(0.005)
(0.004)
(0.005)
T−1
0.011 *
0.005
0.004
(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.006)
T
0.023 **
0.022 **
0.012
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.008)
T+1
0.014 **
0.010
0.014 *
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.007)
T+2
0.000
0.000
0.019 *
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.009)
T+3
0.005
0.016
−0.002
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.009)
T+4
0.002
0.004
−0.004
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.007)
[T − 1, T + 1]
[T − 3, T + 3]
[T − 4, T + 4]

0.048 **
0.044 **
0.033

0.036 *
0.026 **
0.025 **

City CPI-All

0.128 **
(0.017)

City fixed effects
Month, year controls

Yes
Yes

Observations
Cities
R2
Adj. R2

0.030 *
0.082 **
0.086 **

8,124
28
0.181
0.170

NOTE: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Regression 9 uses the pooled monthly and bimonthly (interpolated) data.
The T − 4 coefficient indicates the partial effect of the minimum wage change on FAFH inflation four months prior
to the date of the minimum wage change. Standard errors corrected for arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity are
reported in parentheses. See Note 20 for degrees of freedom adjustment made to correct for use of interpolated data.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review reports (various years).
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Table 10 Pass-Through Effects by Policy Context Dependent Variable: FAFH Inflation
(10)a
Minimum wage change
Washington, D.C.
San Francisco
Reference group
T−4
−0.0017 **
0.0009
0.0002
(0.0007)
(0.0006)
(0.0002)
T−3
0.0007
-0.0001
0.0001
(0.0005)
(0.0004)
(0.0002)
T-2
0.0006
−0.0005
0.0001
(0.0007)
(0.0005)
(0.0002)
T−1
0.0004
−0.0001
−0.0003
(0.0006)
(0.0004)
(0.0002)
T
0.0000
0.0015
−0.0004 *
(0.0007)
(0.0009)
(0.0002)
T+1
0.009
0.0014
0.0001
(0.0009)
(0.0009)
(0.0002)
T+2
0.0023 **
0.0004
0.0003
(0.0008)
(0.0009)
(0.0002)
T+3
−0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
(0.0005)
(0.0009)
(0.0002)
T+4
0.0000
0.0001
0.0001
(0.0009)
(0.0008)
(0.0002)
[T − 1, T + 1]
[T − 4, T + 4]

0.0014
0.0032

0.0028
0.0036

City CPI-All

0.124 **
(0.0172)

City fixed effects
Month, year controls

Yes
Yes

Observations
Cities
R2
Adj. R2

−0.0006
0.0004

8,124
28
0.172
0.162

NOTE: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Regression 10 uses the pooled monthly and bimonthly (interpolated) data.
a Coefficients are based on dummy variables, and therefore do not measure wage-price elasticities. See text (the section titled
“Special Case: City Minimum Wage Hikes” on p. 31) for details.
The T − 4 coefficient indicates the partial effect of the minimum wage change on FAFH inflation four months prior to the date of
the minimum wage change. Standard errors corrected for arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses. See
Note 20 for degrees of freedom adjustment made to correct for use of interpolated data.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review reports (various years).
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Table 11 Pass-Through Effects by Policy Context Dependent Variable: FAFH Inflation
(11)
Minimum wage change
Indexed
Scheduled
T−4
0.006 *
−0.014 **
(0.003)
(0.004)
T−3
0.001
−0.008
(0.004)
(0.004)
T−2
−0.001
0.000
(0.005)
(0.005)
T−1
0.008
0.012 *
(0.005)
(0.005)
T
0.011 *
0.024 **
(0.005)
(0.007)
T+1
0.001
0.015 **
(0.007)
(0.006)
T+2
0.003
0.001
(0.007)
(0.004)
T+3
0.010 *
0.005
(0.004)
(0.004)
T+4
0.005
0.002
(0.004)
(0.004)
[T −1, T + 1]
[T − 4, T + 4]

0.020 *
0.044 **

0.051 **
0.037

City CPI-All

One-shot
−0.002
(0.003)
−0.004
(0.003)
−0.006
(0.005)
0.003
(0.003)
0.025 **
(0.007)
0.014 **
(0.005)
0.001
(0.004)
−0.004
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
0.040 **
0.023 *

0.128 **
(0.017)

City fixed effects
Month, year controls

Yes
Yes

Observations
Cities
R2

8,124
28
0.181

NOTE: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Regression 11 uses the pooled monthly and bimonthly (interpolated) data.
The T − 4 coefficient indicates the partial effect of the minimum wage change on FAFH inflation four months prior to the date of
the minimum wage change. Standard errors corrected for arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses. See
Note 20 for degrees of freedom adjustment made to correct for use of interpolated data.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review reports (various years).
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Table 12 Tests of the Equality of Coefficients across Policy Contexts
Federal vs. state
(robustness
S.F. vs.
D.C. vs.
Small vs. Indexed vs. Indexed vs. Federal vs. check, see
reference
reference
large
scheduled
one-shot
state
notes)
group
group
8
11
11
9
9
10
10
0.4863
0.1478
0.1071
0.9350
0.9203
0.0414
0.7256

Regression
p-value (equality of
contemporaneous
coefficients)
p-value (equality of T 0.0149
− 1 through T + 1
coefficients)

0.0432

0.0925

0.3838

0.1894

0.0227

0.0942

NOTE: This table reports p-values for F-tests of the equality of coefficients across different subsamples of the data. For example,
the p-value of 0.0149 reported in the “Small vs. large” column indicates that when a test of the equality of the coefficients in that
regression is conducted, Pr( > F) = 0.0149 and thus equality can be rejected at the 0.05 level of confidence.
In the last column, the results are from an unreported regression on a subsample of our data that includes series whose samples
are only taken from a single state (unlike, say, Boston or New York City whose samples include restaurants in Connecticut and
Philadelphia respectively). See Note 29.
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of results from Tables 8–11.
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Figure 1 Interpolation and a Stylized Minimum Wage Hike
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Figure 2 Impact of Minimum Wage Increase in Monopsonistic Competition
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